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RECENT DECISIONS
50 (1939); Harper, Torts, 294 (1933), only two other jurisdictions have also
cast aside the bonds of stare decisis, and have declared the policy overruled,
charities henceforth being fully liable for the torts of their employees, like any
other corporation. Porto Rico Gas and Coke Co. v. Frank Rullan and Assoc.,
Rullen v. U. S., U. S. v.Foard et al, (3 cases), 189 F. 2nd 397 (1st Cir. 1951).
Malloy v.F ng, 37 A. C. 356, 232 P. 2nd 241 (1951). See also, Cal. Code Civ.
Proc., sec. 1714; Puerto Rico Civil Code, sec. 1802-3; 39 Cal. L Rev. 455 (1951).
It is submitted that the principal case not only takes proper cognizance of
the changing social and economic conditions, and thus better enables the law to
keep "abreast of the times,' but also that the Ray case may well be a foretelling
of a nation wide overthrow of the Charities' Tort Immunity Doctrine.
Robert Alan Thompson
CONTRACTS-AGREEMENTS

NOT TO COMPETE-POWERS OF EQUITY
TO SCALE DOWN UNREASONABLE TERMS

Defendant sold his bakery located in Boston, Mass. to plaintiff. Defendant
agreed in the bill of sale that he would "not engage in the bakery business directly
or indirectly for a period of seven years within a radius of seven miles of Boston."
The following year defendant entered the employ of another baker in the city at a
weekly salary. Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from engaging in the bakery
business according to the terms of the bill of sale. The lower court found the
limitations of seven years and seven miles unreasonable. The judge found it
reasonable however, to restrain defendant from engaging in the bakery business
"directly or indirectly" within a radius of four miles from plaintiff's bakery, and for
a period of four years. The court then held that defendant had violated the new
"reasonable" restrictions, and issued an order restraining defendant from continuing
in such business. On appeal the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed.
Thomas et al v. Paker - Mass -, 98 N. E. 640 (1951).
Early English and American decisions evince a strong tendency to strike down
covenants not to compete. Mitchell v. Reynolds 1 Pere Williams 181 (1711).
Noble v. Bates, 7 Cow. 307 (N. Y. 1827). For history of restrictive convenants
see Hall Mfg. Co. v. Western Steel, 227 Fed. 588, at 592 (6th circuit 1915).
Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber 106 N. Y. 463, 13 N. E. 419, (1887). Also see
Restatement, Contracts, sec. 513, (1932), 5 Williston, Contracts sec. 1633, 1636,
(Revised Edition, 1937). 6 Corbin, Contracts, sec. 1379 (First Edition 1951).
However, modern authority upholds such covenants when two requirements are
satisfied. The covenant must be (1) ancillary or subordinate to the main purpose
of the contract and (2) reasonably necessary for the protection of the business and
goodwill. See Justice Taft's noted dictum in Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. U. S.
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85 Fed. 271 (6th Circuit 1898), 6 Corbin, Contracts sec. 1386, Restatement,
Contracts, sec. 513 (e), 515, 516 (a) (b) (c), illust. 2. (1932), 46 Harvard
L R. 1188 (1933); and see the following state statutory provisions, Ala. Code
title 9, sec. 22, 24) 1940). Okla. title 15, sec. 217, 218, 219, (1941).
The general rule that courts will not alter unreasonable terms of a contract
has been held to apply to restrictive covenants. Interstate Finance Corp. v. Wood,
69 F. Supp. 278 (E.D. Illinois 1946), where restraint was for one year and three
states, it was stated that the court cannot by "judicial decision create a new and
different contract." In re American Motor Produacts Corp. 98 F. 2nd 774 (2nd
circuit 1938) held that a court may not "substitute its ideas"- for those in the
contract. See also 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence sec. 1378 (5th edition, 1941),
McClintock, Equity, sec. 26, (2nd edition 1948). Restatement, Contracts, sec. 518
comment (b) (1932). But see 6 Corbin, Contracts sec. 1389, p. 501, 5 Williston,
Contracts, sec. 1666. An exception to this general rule has been made in contracts
where terms were considered "divisible." Originally, a term was divisible if the
unreasonable portion could be "blue pencilled" out, leaving only a reasonable
restriction. Attwood v. Lamon 2 K B. 146 (1920), Central N. Y?.Tel. and Tel.
Co. v. Averill 199 N. Y. 128, 92 N. E. 206, (1910), 6 Corbin, Contracts, sec.
1390, 5 Williston, Contracts sec. 1659. Divisibility no longer is limited by the
"blue pencilling" criterion. Courts by paying mere lip service to this fictional
"test" found a means of rewriting unreasonable terms of contracts. Thus where
the seller agreed not to compete in the states of New York and New Jersey, the
court ruled the terms "divisible" and barred the seller from New York City and
Jersey City. Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino 53 F. 2nd 112 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
Corbin sec. 1389, 22 Virginia L.Rev. 94 (1935-1936). As Professor Corbin says,
"divisibility" no longer has any definition. 6 Corbin, Contracts sec. 1389-1390.
Courts merely used "divisibility" to safeguard the reasonable expectations of the
contracting parties.
The principal case represents the culmination of a recent line of Massachusetts
decisions allowing courts of equity to scale down unreasonable provisions of
restrictive covenants without resort to the divisibility fiction. Thus in Edgecomb
v. Edmonston 257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99 (1926) and Whiting Milk Co. v.
O'Connell 277 Mass. 570, 179 N. E.169 (1932) the court reduced the size of the
territory restricted by the covenant. Similarly the court in Metropolitan Ice
Co. v. Ducas 291 Mass. 403 , 196 N. E.856 (1935) reduced the time limitation.
Also see Chase Laboratories Inc. v. Hennessey et al--Mass.-, 97 N. E.2nd 397
(1951) and 46 Harvard L. Rev. 1188 (1933), and for a critical examination of
the evolution of the Massachusetts rule see 15 Boston U. L Rev. 834 (1935).
Professors Williston and Corbin in their respective works approve the Massachusetts practice of outright revision. 5 Williston, Contracts sec. 1660, 6 Corbin, Contracts, sec. 1389, although Professor Williston warns that flagrantly oppressive coy.
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enants obviously designed to take advantage of the "outright revisions" rule should
be stricken in toto.
A tendency may be observed in some states to follow the Massachusetts rule
in both statute and decisions. See Ala. code, title 9 sec. 22, 24, (1940), Okla. title
15 sec. 217, 218, 219, (1941), Yost v. Patrick 245 Ala. 275, 17 So. 2nd 240
(1943). Edward v. Mullin 220 Cal. 379, 30 P. 2nd 997 (1934). Hartman v.
Everett 158 Okla. 29, 12 P. 2nd 543 (1932).
New York appears to be slowly accepting the Massachusetts rule. An isolated
Court of Appeals decision indicated tacit agreement with the recent Massachusetts
holdings. Thus in InterstateTea Co. v. Alt, 271 N. Y. 76, 2 N. E. 2nd 51, (1936)
the court after looking for and failing to find divisibility, proceeded to alter an unreasonable provision of a restrictive covenant. In that opinion Judge Loughran
changed the definition of the term "customer" as contained in the original contract.
Two Appellate Division decisions show a similar acceptance of the Massachusetts
rule. Thus in Widder Dye and Chem. Co. v. United States Marking Tag Co.,
241 App. Div. 703, 269 N. Y. S. 802 (2nd Dep't. 1934) the court stated a
covenant may be "enforced as far as is necessary to protect plaintiffs from competition." Similarly in Goldstein v. Maisel, 271 App. Diy. 971, 67 N. Y. S. 2nd 410
(2nd Dep't. 1947) the court scaled down an unlimited restricted area to read New
York City. The Court of Appeals has yet to go further than the cautious approach
of the Alt case.
The purpose of such covenants, restricting competition, is to secure to the
buyer the business and good will which he has purchased. The employer who has
entrusted his employee with trade secrets or customer lists is also entitled to
reasonable protection. Interstate Tea Co. v. Alt, supra. The entire covenant
should not be stricken down because of an unreasonable or excessive restraint
which may be altered by the court. Nor should Courts be forced to hide behind a
test of divisibility which has come to be in fact, no test. 6 Corbin, Contracts, sec.
1389. The reasonable expectations of the parties should not be made to depend
on the readiness of the Court to find a fictitious "divisibility." The principal case
and the line of decisions permitting courts of equity to scale down covenants not to
compete, assures employers and purchasers safety while barring unreasonable
limitations.
Daniel T. Roach

